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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CANADA'S 
''WIDELY HELD" RULE FOR LARGE BANKS 
ERIC J. GOUVIN* 
1. INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF Two COUNTRIES 
When representatives of the United States, Canada, and Mexico 
signed the North American Free Trade Agreement l ("NAFTA") in 
1992, the schedule of reservations and commitments on the annex 
relating to financial services gave the distinct impression that Mexico 
and Canada were not inclined to embrace fully the idea of free and 
unfettered trade in banking services. While NAFTA broke new ground 
by setting out a principles-based approach to liberalized trade in 
financial services,2 Canada and Mexico made it clear that they intended 
to keep in place the non-tariff barriers3 that ensured that their largest 
banks would remain under domestic control. 
At the outset, it appeared that Mexico had a stronger commitment to 
banking protectionism.4 At the time ofNAFTA's negotiation, Mexico's 
banking market was dominated by six large national banks, with seven 
regional institutions playing a secondary role.s Prior to NAFTA, Mexi-
co's banking market was closed to U.S. and Canadian banks.6 NAFTA 
changed that by permitting U.S. and Canadian banks to establish 
wholly owned banking subsidiaries in Mexico. 7 But while Mexico 
opened its banking system through NAFTA, it also negotiated for some 
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A. Cornell University; 
J.D., LL.M. Boston University; MPA HaIVard University. The author thanks Dennis Encarnation 
for comments made on earlier versions of this Article. 
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289 
(entered into forceJan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTAJ. 
2. See Cally Jordan, Financial Seroices Under NAFTA: The View From Canada, REv. OF BANKING AND 
FIN. SERVICES, Mar. 24, 1993, at 45, 51 n.39. 
3. See generally JOAN EDELMfu'J SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
82-83 (2d ed. 1981) (describing and discussing the general pro blem of non tariff barriers to trade). 
4. Mexico's reservations and commitments in the general Annex VII totaled twenty-two 
pages, while Canada's were only four pages long. NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex VII, 32 I.L.M. at 
769-76. 
5. See Carlos M. Naida, Note, NAFTA, Foreign Investment, and The Mexican Banking System, 26 
CEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 379, 388 (1992). 
6. See Leslie M. Norwood, Note, International Banking-U.S. Banks Operating Abroad, 15 ANN. 
REv. BANKING L. 169, 174 (1996). 
7. See Eric Palace, Comment, International Banking-Foreign Banks Operating in the United States, 
14 ANN. REv. BANKlNGL.154, 161-62 (1995). 
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protections to prevent foreign domination of the Mexican banking 
industry; specifically, Mexico set out aggregate capital limits for foreign 
subsidiaries.8 
As originally conceived, U.S. and Canadian institutions would have 
been permitted to acquire outright existing Mexican banks after a 
transition period, subject to the limitation that the sum of the capital of 
the acquired bank and any affiliate of the foreign acquirer not exceed 
four percent of the aggregate capital of all commercial banks in 
Mexico.9 The clear purpose of these restrictions was to protect Mexi-
co's six largest banks from foreign acquisition. lO 
Events overtook the original protectionist plan, however, forcing 
Mexico to liberalize its foreign ownership rules. ll Viewed through the 
lens of history, this turn of events is not surprising-throughout its past, 
Mexico has been dependent on foreign capital for economic develop-
ment. 12 The NAFTA provisions were intended to break that cycle of 
foreign dependence and continue the revitalization of the Mexican 
banking industry initiated by the reprivatization of the state-controlled 
banks in 1990-92.13 Nevertheless, the protectionist provisions clearly 
8. When foreign banking was first permitted in 1994, the aggregate capital share of foreign 
subsidiaries in the Mexican domestic market was limited to eight percent. The Mexican plan 
called for an increasingly liberal scheme of foreign ownership over a six-year transition period, 
which in the last year of the transition would have permitted foreign banks to control an aggregate 
ofl5% of the capital in the commercial banking market. NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex VII (B)(9), 
321.L.M. at 774. At the end of the transition period, the aggregate capital limits would have lapsed 
subject only to Mexico's reserved right to impose additional limitations on banking competition if 
foreign banks control 25% of the Mexican banking market before January 1, 2004. See Ramon 
Bravo H., Mexican Legal Framework Applicable to Operations Involving Financial Services, 25 ST. MARY'S 
LJ. 1239, 1249-51 (1994). 
9. SeeNAFTA, supra note 1, Annex VII (B) (9), 321.L.M. at 775. 
10. See Naida, supra note 5, at 407. 
11. See Robert Del Cueto & Luis D. Martinez, The Restructuring of Banking and Financial Services 
in Mexico: The Legal Refonn of the Mexican Financial System, 7 U.S.-MEX. LJ. 59, 62-63 (1999) 
(describing the banking reform package passed by the Mexican Congress in December 1998). 
12. After three centuries of Spanish colonial exploitation, Mexico won its independence in 
1821, but had very little financial infrastructure in place to support an independent economy. See 
Naida, supra note 5, at 380-81. After independence, Mexico rarely had the sustained domestic 
tranquility necessary to develop that infrastructure. In the 1800s, Mexico resisted an invasion from 
Spain, two invasions from France, and significant border battles and outright war with the United 
States. Id. These geopolitical troubles not only hampered Mexico's development of a domestic 
financial system, but forced Mexico to obtain financing from foreign sources. 
13. See John E. Rogers & Adrian Zubikairi Arriola, Foreign Banks in Mexico: On the Vqre of a NImJ 
Era?, 7 U.S.-MEX. LJ. 11, 13-14 (1999) (noting Mexico's desire to ease the transition for the 
recently privatized banks); Bronwen Davis, Comment, Mexico's Commercial Banking Industry: Can 
Mexico's Recently Privatized Banks Compete With the United States Banking Industry After Enactment of the 
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appear to have failed in their goal of safeguarding domestic banks from 
foreign control. 
The protectionist provisions were designed to nurture the recently 
privatized Mexican banks, but, ironically, the privatization process itself 
sowed the seeds of the protectionist scheme's demise. After reprivatiza-
tion in the early 1990s, Mexican banks grew at a furious rate. 14 Most 
banks were owned by financial groups dominated by securities firms 
with high risk tolerances, and the bank managers hired to run these 
institutions felt pressure to recover the rich premiums paid to acquire 
the banks. I5 Consequently, loan quality dropped, while loan growth 
soared; eventually, banks had to increase significantly their loan loss 
reserves. 16 The devaluation of the peso in late 1994, together with the 
credit quality problem, sent Mexico's banks into crisis. In response to 
the crisis, international and Mexican banking concerns took action to 
stabilize the Mexican banking system. 17 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1994 peso crisis, Mexico modified, 
but did not abandon, its foreign ownership rules to permit greater 
foreign influence in the banking system. IS As times got more difficult, 
however, Mexico once again turned to foreign capital. Although Mexi-
can banks showed a revival and demand for peso-denominated loans 
had been increasing/9 the weaknesses in the banking system were 
North American Free Trade Agreement?, 10 ARIz.]. INT'L & COMPo L. 77, 87-89 (1993) (chronicling the 
privatization process and noting that the Mexican government earned $12.9 billion on the sale of 
the banks). 
14. See Roy A. Karaoglan & Mike Lubrano, Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 Devalua-
tion-A Chronology of the Government's Response, 16 Nw.]. INT'L L. & Bus. 24, 25-26 (1995) (reporting 
that during the period 1991 to 1994, assets of Mexican banks grew 111.3% in nominal terms, and 
64.6% in real terms, equal to a real annual growth rate ofl8.1 %). 
15. See Stephen L. Fluckiger, The Mexican Banking Crisis: Remedies and Opportunities, 50 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 76, 76 (1996). 
16. See Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 14, at 27 (noting the increase of loan loss reserves). 
17. See Norwood, supra note 6, at 173-174. See generally Javier Gavito et aI., Mexico's Banking 
Crisis: Origins, Consequences and Countermeasures, in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter REGULATION fu'iD SUPERVISION) (providing a detailed history of the peso crisis and the 
response thereto); Fluckiger, supra note 15 (outlining the regulatory changes brought about by 
the crisis); Karaoglan & Lubrano, supra note 14 (describing the government's response to the 
peso devaluation). 
18. In February 1995, Mexico liberalized the rules for foreign ownership of its banks. See 
Fluckiger, supra note 15, at 79 (describing changes in Mexican law that expand but do not 
eliminate the NAFTA foreign ownership limits). 
19. See Craig Torres, Mexico's Banking System Is Having A Revival--Loan Demand Rises Among 
Businesses, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 28, 1998, at A12. 
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serious, and Mexican banks had a great deal of difficulty attracting 
capital. 20 Politically, it became extremely embarrassing for the Mexican 
federal government to bail out the troubled banking institutions, 
especially as political reforms permitted the formation of meaningful 
opposition to the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party in Con-
gress.21 
In December 1998, Mexico changed its domestic banking laws in a 
way that rendered the NAFTA restrictions almost moot. Today, Mexico 
allows broad foreign ownership of its banks, subject to regulator 
approval. 22 Some of Mexico's largest banks are now foreign-owned,23 
though the Mexican government retains the right under NAFTA to 
freeze foreign ownership if foreign-owned institutions control more 
than twenty-five percent of the market.24 yvhile Mexico has changed its 
foreign ownership rules, in part due to its need for foreign capital, part 
of the liberalization may also be attributed to a belief in the benefits of 
barrier-free trade.25 Other sectors of the Mexican economy have been 
participating in free trade with great enthusiasm and success.26 It IS 
20. SeeJonathan Friedland, Mexico's Big Banks Can't Lure Investors, WALL ST.J.,July 16,1998, at 
A13. 
21. See Jose de Cordoba, Mexican Banking System Bailout Is Bonanza for Opposition Leader, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 27, 1998, at Al 0; Jonathan Friedland, In Mexico, opposition Flexes Muscle, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 2, 1998, atA29;Jonathan Friedland, Mexican Officials Land in the Hot Seat, WALL ST.J.,July 31, 
1998, at A9 (describing Congressional hearings investigating the banking crisis); Mexican Banks: 
Debts to Society, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 6. 1999, at 79, 79 (reporting on the political outcome of the 
banking crisis proposals); Geri Smith, A Torpedo That Could Cripple the Economy, Bus. WK., June 22, 
1998, at 62,62 (reporting on the political turmoil caused by the banking crisis). 
22. See Del Cueto &·Martinez, supra note 11, at 62-63. 
23. See Peter Fritsch, Bank Deal to Create New Mexican Behemoth, WALL ST.J.,June 13, 2000, at 
A19 (reporting on the takeover of Bancomer by Spanish banking concern Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria SA to create the largest bank in Mexico-controlling about 30% of the banking 
market); see also Pamela Druckerman, Spain's BSCH Wins Major Mexican Bank, WALL ST.J., May 9, 
2000, at A23 (reporting that the Spanish firm Banco Santander Central Hispano SA won an 
auction for the Mexican Grupo Financicro Scrfin SA). 
24. See John Rogers et aI., The Restructuring of Mexican Financial Services and the Application of 
Chapter 14 ofNAFTA, 7 U.S.-MEX. LJ. 67, 67 (1999). 
25. See DAVID FRIEDMAN, HIDDEN ORDER 282-87 (1996) (providing a simple mathematical 
proof of why elimination of tariffs, even on a unilateral basis, is wealth maximizing); N. GREGORY 
MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 202-04 (3d ed. 1997) (setting forth the widely accepted view that while 
protectionist trade policies have no affect on the trade balance, they do affect the amount oftrade, 
and that trade benefits all countries, whereas protectionism makes everyone worse off even if it 
produces some winners within a society). 
26. See Joel Millman, Trade Wins: The World's New Tiger On the Export Scene Isn't Asian; It's 
Mexico, WALLST.J., May 9, 2000, at AI. 
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possible that the forces of political freedom that are reshaping Mexic027 
believe that less-restrictive cross-border trade in financial services will 
increase competition; reduce prices; help eliminate inefficient regula-
tion; and otherwise improve the market for financial services and the 
overall climate for business growth in Mexico.28 
The experience offoreign bank ownership in Mexico since NAFTA, 
then, is one of abandonment of protectionist ownership rules and an 
acquiescence to, if not an embracing of, the free market for bank 
control. Canada is a different story. While the Canadian Bankers 
Association touts international banking as the ideal export,29 Canada 
has not openly embraced unfettered international access to its own 
banking system. Instead, Canada has aimed to give the appearance of 
liberality, while jealously guarding its largest banking institutions against 
the possibility of foreign takeover. Canada has clung to this strategy 
even while engaging in a series of sweeping banking law reforms 
designed to modernize the Canadian banking system and make it 
internationally competitive. 
Unlike Mexico, where changes in the banking regulatory scheme 
have been precipitated by crises, Canada subjects its banking law to 
periodic and systematic reconsideration, resulting in major revisions 
about once every ten years.30 The use of these regular reviews, together 
with the different political dynamic of the parliamentary system,31 
among other factors, has allowed Canada to modernize its financial 
system quite quickly. On its face, the trend in Canadian banking law 
reform has been to eliminate the traditional product line restrictions in 
27. The recent election of Vicente Fox has been seen by some as evidence that free markets 
and free politics go hand-in-hand. See Editorial, Mexico: open Markets, open Politics, Bus. WK., july 
17, 2000, at 164, 164 ("Fox's election is a rousing vindication of the principle that open markets 
can be a positive force for political change."); see also Peter Fritsch, Mexican f-conomy Drives Political 
Shift, WALL ST.j.,june 26, 2000, atA21 (comparing the implementation ofNAFfA to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall). 
28. See Ernesto Aguirre, International Economic Integration and Trade in Financial Services: 
Analysis from a Latin American Perspective, 27 LAw & POI:Y INT'L Bus. 1057,1060 (1996) ("liberaliza-
tion may raise the average efficiency of industry, and this should be reflected in lower prices for 
financial services and products"). 
29. See CAN. BANKERS AsS'N, CANADtAN BANK FAGrS 4 (2000) [hereinafter CBA FAGrs] (noting 
that Canadian banks are major, exporters, generating 49% of the their earnings abroad, while 
having 90% of their workforce located in Canada and paying 77% of their taxes in Canada). 
30. See Ci·tARLES FREEDMAN, THE CANADtAN BANKING SvsTEM 1 (1998). 
31. See john F. Chant, Canada's Economy and Financial System: Recent and Prospective Develop-
ments and the Policy Issues They Pose, in THE BAc'lKlNG AND FINAc'lCIAL STRUGrURE IN THE NAFT A 
COUNTRIES Ac'lD CHILE 3, 36-37 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 1997) [hereinafter BANKING AND 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE]. 
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the financial services sector and to permit easier foreign entry into the 
Canadian banking market. For example, at the time NAFTA was 
adopted, Canadian law prohibited non-Canadians from owning more 
than twenty-five percent of the shares of a domestic bank.32 Under 
NAFTA's general national treatment requirement, Canada had to give 
the United States and Mexico relief from that provision.33 Shortly after 
providing that relief, Canada proceeded to repeal the foreign owner-
ship law altQgether, in order to comply with the World Trade Organiza-
tion Agreement ("WTO Agreement"). 34 So, while Canada appeared to 
be making foreign access more liberal, it really only did away with an 
obviously unacceptable protectionist provision that would not pass 
muster in the international arena. 
Similarly, in 1980, Canada appeared to liberalize foreign access to 
the Canadian market by permitting foreign banks to establish so-called 
Schedule II banks as subsidiaries. The Schedule II banks were permit-
ted, subject to the caveat that together they could not control more 
than eight percent of the nation's banking assets.35 Over the years, the 
32. Those restrictions were formerly found in the Bank Act, but were repealed in 1994. R.S.C. 
ch. B-1.0l, § 399(1) (1985), repealed by ch. 47, 1994 S.c. 20 (Can.). 
33. The Bank Act now makes special provision for "NAFTA country residents." See Bank Act, 
R.S.C. ch. B-1.01, § ILl (Can.). 
34. See CAN. BANKERS AsS'N, OUR VISION OF THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN FINANCIAL SERVICES 
SECTOR: SUBMISSION TO THE TASK FORCE 44 (1997) [hereinafter CBA SUBMISSION). 
35. See FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 8-9 & n.14. One might argue, with some justification, that 
the 1980 amendments did not improve the situation for foreign firms servicing the Canadian 
market, but in fact made it more expensive for foreign banks to do business there. See John 
Harman, Working the Corners, CAN. BANKER, May:June 1996, at 23,24-25 (providing an interesting 
perspective on the significance of the 1980 amendments as they related to foreign entry). Harman 
states: 
Before 1967, foreign banks operated relatively unfettered, as either branches or banks. 
But ir a wave of nationalistic fervor, the 1967 Bank Act effectively excluded foreign 
bank subsidiaries. The result was not what the government had intended ... Between 
1967 and 1981, foreign banks operated in Canada as incorporated entities, raising 
capital through the Canadian money market, usually with the backing of their parent 
banks, among the world's largest. Since these "near-banks" were operating outside the 
Bank Act, they weren't required to maintain reserves with the Bank of Canada, which 
gave them a 50- to 75-basis-point advantage on loan rates ... Working in this fashion, 
the foreign banks prospered. They were able to compete effectively for corporate 
business, both with Canadian companies and subsidiaries of companies that their 
parent banks were already dealing with. Indeed, many of them would have been 
satisfied to continue operating in this way. 
Id. at 24. 
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asset limitations were raised, and then eliminated altogether, as Can-
ada made commitments under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Act, NAFTA, 
and the WTO Agreement.36 Nevertheless, the foreign-owned Schedule 
II subsidiary was a second-class Canadian citizen even without the asset 
limitations. Until the branching legislation adopted in 1998, foreign-
owned Schedule II banks had to comply with additional restrictions not 
required of Canadian banks in order to establish branches across 
Canada.37 Even with the branching legislation, however, the Schedule 
II bank structure provides non-Canadians less than perfect access to the 
Canadian market, because the required juridical form for cross-border 
retail banking-the subsidiary-is not as beneficial to the foreign 
institution as cross-border branching.38 
Although NAFTA liberalized access to the Canadian banking mar-
ket, it did not eliminate all obstacles to cross-border banking.39 Indeed, 
36. SeeCBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 47. 
37. See Eric J. Gouvin, Cross-Border Bank Branching Under the NAFT A: Public Choice and the Law of 
Corporate Groups, 13 CONN.]. INT'L L. 257, 270-71 (1999). 
38. All other things being equal, from the point of view of the parent banking organization, 
cross-border branching should be more economically attractive than setting up a foreign 
subsidiary because capital, accounting, and legal costs can be shared more easily. See Stephen 
Zamora, Comments on the Regulation of Financial and Legal Services in Mexico Under NAFTA, 1 
U.S.-MEX. LJ. 77,79 (1993). In addition, loans generated by a branch may rely on the capital of 
the home bank in the home country instead of on the branch's capital. See MICHAEL GRUSON & 
RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS, at 1-26 (2nd ed. 1995). On the other hand, 
liabilities of the branch will be imposed on the home office more readily than would the 
obligations of a separately organized subsidiary. See Wells Fargo Asia, Ltd. v: Citibank, N.A., 936 
F.2d 723, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1991), ccrt. denied, 505 U.S. 1204 (1992) (holding that absent a 
contractual restriction on the place of collection, a customer of a foreign branch may recover the 
amount of the obligation from the bank's home U.S. office). The risk offoreign sovereign actions 
that make meeting obligations impossible was addressed somewhat by amendments in 1994 to the 
Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which changed the law to hold the 
home U.S. offices liable for such obligations 'only if agreed to in writing. See Palace, supra note 7, at 
169 (describing the amendments). 
39. One of the biggest obstacles to cross-border banking remaining in place involves the 
permissible legal structure of banking enterprises in the member countries. The NAFT A left the 
issue of cross-border branching for future resolution, and memorialized that compromise in 
article 1403 (3), which states: 
at such time as the United States permits commercial banks of another Party located in 
its territory to expand through subsidiaries or direct branches into substantially all of 
the United States market, the parties shall review and assess market access provided by 
each party ... with a view to adopting arrangements permitting investors of another 
Party to choose the juridical form of establishment of commercial banks. 
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1403(3),32 LL.M. at 657. 
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prior to 1998, Canada was one of only two countries in the top fifty 
market economies that did not permit branching within its territory by 
foreign banks.40 In theory, NAFTA adopted an approach to cross-
border expansion that would have allowed foreign banks to decide 
whether to branch or establish a subsidiary.41 In reality, through a 
scheduled exception to NAFTA, foreign banks were not permitted to 
branch into Canada, but instead were required to establish a Canadian 
bank subsidiary.42 In 1998, Canada changed its branching policy to 
permit foreign banks to branch into Canada, thereby appearing to 
advance the NAFTA goal offree trade in financial services. Once again, 
however, the changes were less than they appeared. 
Canada's branching legislation liberalized its market entry require-
ments sufficiently to conform with the commitments Canada made as 
part of the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") of the 
WTO.43 But it seems that Canada consciously emulated American 
branching requirements,44 which appear liberal, but on closer inspec-
tion are rather difficult for foreign banks to exploit. Canadian law now 
permits foreign banks to branch into Canada subject to the following 
restrictions, among others: (1) only foreign banks with assets of at least 
$35 billion are permitted to branch; (2) foreign branches may not take 
40. See Larry M. Greenberg, Canada's Banks Question Their Cocoon, WALL ST.]., Apr. 16, 1998, 
atAl7. 
41. Section 1403(1) says that investors of a Party should be free to establish financial 
institutions in the other countries "in the juridical form chosen by such investor." NAFTA supra 
note 1, art. 1403(1), 32 I.L.M. at 657. The import of that provision is that banks should be able to 
expand across borders by establishing either branches or subsidiaries as dictated by their business 
plan rather than by banking law. 
42. See Greenberg, supra note 40. To the extent foreign banks are present in Canada, they do 
business through Schedule II banks, which account for about 12% of the banking assets in 
Canada. 
43. See Robert E. Elliott, The 1997 Federal Financial Institutions Legislative Review and Beyond, 16 
NAT'L BANKING L. REv. 49, 55 (1997). 
44. Regulatory harmonization in North America is often characterized by "regulatory 
emulation." See Arthur]. Cockfield, Tax Integration Under NAFrA: Resolving the Conflict Between 
Economic and Sovereignty Interests, 34 STAN.]. INT'L L. 39, 45-46 (1998) (describing the idea of 
regulatory emulation in North America in the tax context). For example, Canada and Mexico 
tend to change their policies to be at least as liberal as the United States in order to ensure that 
they have not erected obstacles to the movement of international resources that would favor 
investment in the United States over either Canada or Mexico. 1d. On a broader level, the United 
States is such an important player in the world economy that its regulatory schemes affect other 
countries in at least three ways: (1) U.S. initiatives produce a competitive dynamic such as the 
emulation just described; (2) other countries imitate U.S. policies; and (3) the United States 
applies direct pressure on other countries to conform their laws to the U.S. scheme. See STEVEN K 
VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES 36-37 (1996). 
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retail deposits; (3) the Canadian regulator may require maintenance of 
assets in Canada to cover branch liabilities; (4) foreign branches must 
maintain, with a Canadian depositary institution, an amount equal to at 
least five percent of branch liabilities; (5) the home bank must meet 
certain standards of supervisory review; (6) the foreign branch is 
subject to Canadian reporting, auditing, and taxation requirements; 
and (7) the Canadian bank regulator has the power to seize all assets of 
the foreign bank to satisfy the liabilities of a branch.45 While giving the 
appearance of providing greater access to the Canadian market, these 
requirements go a long way toward completely eliminating the benefit 
of the branch form of expansion, thereby shielding Canadian banks 
from the competition that might have resulted from this form of 
lower-cost foreign entry. 
II. GENESIS OF THE WIDELY HELD RULE 
All of the recent changes in foreign access to Canada's banking 
market have been essentially cosmetic-appearing to make foreign 
access more liberal while in reality changing the status quo very little. 
On one point, the so-called widely held rule, Canada does not even 
bother to pretend that its banking law is friendly to foreign entrants. 
Under this rule, no person or group may control ten percent or more 
of a Schedule I bank46 unless one first obtains the approval of the 
Minster of Finance.47 This rule makes foreign acquisition of a Schedule 
I bank virtually impossible. 
The widely held rule was enacted in 1967 in response to the acquisi-
tion of Mercantile Bank by First National City Bank (predecessor to 
today's Citicorp)48 and the fear that Toronto-Dominion Bank was an 
intended target of a hostile takeover from Chase Manhattan.49 The rule 
45. See Elliott, supra note 43, at 55. 
46. All banks are federally chartered and fall into one of two categories, referred to as 
"Schedule I" and "Schedule II" banks. See Bank Act, R.S.C. ch. B-l.Ol, § 14 (1996) (Can.); see also 
Jordan, supra note 2, at 46 & n.8. At present, the Schedule I banks are the "Big Five"-Royal Bank 
of Canada, Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, and 
Toronto Dominion Bank-together with National Bank of Canada, Laurentian Bank, and 
Canadian Western Bank. See CBA FACTS, supra note 29, at 28-30 (listing the chartered banks of 
Canada and indicating whether they are Schedule I or Schedule II banks). 
47. See Bank Act, R.S.C. ch. B-1.01, § 370(2) (1996) (Can.). 
48. See GRAHAM D. TAYLOR & PETER A. BASKERVILLE, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BUSINESS IN CANADA 
454 (1994). 
49. See CBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 44;John Urquhart, Canada Plans Measures That Ease 
Way For Banks to Make Foreign Acquisitions, WALL ST.j.,June 21, 1999, atA4. 
2001] 399 
LAW & POllCY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
was clearly intended to thwart foreign takeovers of Canadian banks, 
especially by American banks. In case the purpose of the law was not 
transparent to all, the widely held rule was originally coupled with an 
additional restriction that foreigners could not own n.venty-five percent 
or more of the total equity in a bank.50 The widely held rule acts like a 
statutory poison pill, making acquisition of a Schedule I bank impos-
sible. For the past thirty-three years, therefore, the big Canadian banks 
have operated free from the fear of hostile takeover and especially free 
from foreign takeover. Yet times do change, and the protectionist 
sentiment that prevailed in the late 1960s in Canada may be succumb-
ing to international norms of free trade that are contemptible of laws 
like the widely held rule. 
The Canadian Parliament therefore is currently considering changes 
to the widely held rule with an eye toward enhancing competition. The 
new scheme will subject banks to different ownership rules based on 
the size of the institution. Banks with equity of less than $1 billion will 
have the most flexibility for ownership options.51 These small banks 
may be wholly owned by a single shareholder, even a commercial 
enterprise.52 This is a departure from the current law, which permits 
most Schedule II banks to be wholly owned, but requires some of them 
to becom.e widely held after ten years, regardless of size.53 Banks with 
equity between $1 billion and $5 billion will be subject to a less flexible 
ownership rule.54 These medium-sized banks will be permitted to be 
closely held but must have at least thirty-five percent of their shares 
held by the public and listed on a Canadian stock exchange.55 These 
publicly owned shares may not be owned by individuals with a .signifi-
cant interest in any class of voting shares.56 Finally, banks with equity in 
excess of $5 billion will continue to be subject to the widely held rule, 
50. See Bank Act, R.S.C. ch. B-1.01, § 399(1) (1985), repealed bych. 47,1994 S.C. 20 (Can.). 
Prior to the repeal of the foreign ownership restriction, the widely held rule was known as the 
"10-25" rule. See CBA SUBMISSION. supra note 34, at 44. 
51. This only affects two Schedule I banks-Laurentian Bank and Canadian Western Bank. 
See Harvey Schachter, A Clear Vision of the Future, CAN. BANKER, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 10, 12 
[hereinafter Schachter, Vision]. 
52. See Harvey Schachter, Ottawa Unveils its Plans for Financial Services, CAN. BANKER, July-Aug. 
1999, at 26, 29 [hereinafter Schachter, Ottawa]. 
53. [d. 
54. At present this medium size category only covers one Schedule I bank-the National 
Bank of Canada. See Schachter, Vision, supra note 51, at 12. 
55. See John Urquhart, Canada Proposes to Relax Rules on Bank Contro~ WALL ST. j., June 28, 
1999, atAl8. 
56. See Schachter, Ottawa, supra note 52, at 29. 
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but on more liberal terms.57 Instead of the current restriction that no 
shareholder own more than ten percent of the equity of a Schedule I 
bank, the new legislation will permit investors to hold up to twenty 
percent of the class of any voting shares, and up to thirty percent of the 
non-voting shares of the larger banks (subject to a test of their suitabil-
ity as prospective owners and the soundness of their business plans). 
This liberalized scheme is ostensibly designed to provide flexibility for 
banks to enter into joint ventures and strategic alliances.58 
It is important to note that under the proposed legislation the widely 
held rule will be liberalized, but not eliminated. In an era of increasing 
international free trade, what is one to make of Canada's barriers to 
foreign entry, such as Schedule II bank restrictions; restrictive branch-
ing requirements; and, especially, the widely held rule? On first blush, 
these measures seem like classic examples of rent-seeking behavior by a 
regulated industry seeking protection by its government overseers.59 
This simplified public choice explanation has special intuitive appeal 
in Canada because the banking industry is so highly concentrated,60 
and hence banking policymakers get a clear picture of what the 
industry wants. It would be quite easy for policymakers to provide the 
banking industry the rent it seeks in exchange for political and other 
considerations.61 The simple public choice description, however, would 
not be an apt one in this situation because the Canadian banking 
industry does not, at present, especially want the widely held rule. 
57. This is the category that covers the "Big Five" banks-Royal Bank of Canada, Bank of 
Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto-Dominion Bank, and the Bank of 
Nova Scotia. 
58. See Schachter, Ottawa, supra note 52, at 26. 
59. This would certainly be the standard interpretation under the "public choice" model of 
legislation, which holds that laws are little more than a product sold in a political marketplace that 
effects a wealth transfer from one group to another. For a general discussion, see generally Robert 
D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REv. 339 (1988). 
60. Instead of the thousands of independent banks found in the United States, Canada is 
dominated by five (or six, depending on who is counting) large institutions with nationwide 
branching networks: the Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada, and Toronto Dominion Bank (and, more marginally, National 
Bank of Canada). See James R. Kraus, Canadian Government s Fears of Concentration Seen Threat to 
Megadeal, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 1998, at 20. 
61. See generally Eric J. Gouvin, Banking in North America: The Triumph of Public Choice over Public 
Policy, 32 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 1, 13-15 (1998) (discussing public choice theory in the regulation of 
banking in North America). Public choice scholars would have little trouble describing this 
dynamic as a bargained for exchange between a powerful interest group and a governmental 
actor. See id. at 30-31 (d~scribing the Canadian banking scene). 
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In its submission to the McKay Task Force on the Future of Canada's 
Finance System, the Canadian Bankers Association ("CBA") provided a 
detailed discussion of the widely held rule and ultimately recom-
mended that the rule be reexamined against current social, economic, 
and political conditions. 52 The CBA's discussion provided a list of the 
reasons for retaining the widely held rule63 and for eliminating it. 54 It is 
clear from the tone of the CBA's remarks, however, that the bankers 
would like to see the widely held rule repealed; every reason for 
retaining the rule was accompanied by a short rejoinder stating why the 
reason was not a sound one, while none of the reasons for eliminating 
the rule was accompanied by such rebuttals. Overall, perhaps because 
of the audience of the CBA's submission and its public nature, the 
reasons offered for and against the rule were quite polite and diplo-
matic. Furthermore, the document did not candidly address the real 
reasons why the bankers would like the rule eliminated or the real 
reasons why the federal government is unlikely to eliminate the rule. 
The following provides a more candid analysis of the reasons for and 
against the widely held rule. 
62. See CBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 43-46. 
63. Included on the list of reasons for retaining the rule are the following: (1) to avoid the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law designed to further U.S. foreign policy objectives; (2) to 
avoid foreign ownership of Canadian banks in order to protect Canadian businesses from lack of 
access to credit in the event of an t;conomic downturn in the foreign bank's home country; (3) to 
maintain the ability of Canadian regulators to use "moral suasion" to achieve Canadian national 
objectives for the financial services sector; (4) to guard against the withdrawal of services in 
Canada due to a downturn in the home country of foreign-owned institutions; (5) to limit the 
ability of commercial firms to own banks; and (6) to safeguard the existence of a Canadian 
banking system as a tool of national policy implementation. See id. at 44. 
64. Included on the list of reasons to eliminate the rule are the following: (1) the rule is 
ineffectual as a protection against foreign ownership, because listing the banks on international 
stock exchanges or by having ten foreign persons acting in concert can circumvent the rule's goal 
of ensuring Canadian-ownership; (2) the rule has the effect of limiting the size of Canadian 
institutions and hampering their ability to obtain economies of scale and scope; (3) from the 
point of view of employment policy, foreign entry is not a bad thing; (4) Canadian investors could 
receive an attractive return from investing in foreign banks as easily as investing in Canadian 
banks; (5) foreign banks could still rise to dominate Canada's market through other modes of 
entry besides a takeover of a Schedule I bank; (6) the rule deprives Schedule I bank shareholders 
of the control premium; (7) the physical location of financial service providers is increasingly 
irrelevant in the current era of technology and communication; (8) the rule might create too 
much insulation from market discipline for the management of Schedule I banks; (9) the rule 
puts Schedule I banks at a disadvantage vis-a-vis other financial service providers who are not 
subject to the rule; and (10) the protections the rule provides against self-dealing are overstated. 
See id. at 45. 
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III. REAsONS FOR REPEALING THE WIDELY HELD RULE 
The bankers would like to s,ee the rule eliminated for several reasons. 
A. Market Forces Protect the General Canadian Retail Banking Market from 
Foreign Competition, so the Rule is Unnecessary to Protect Canadian Banks. 
Canadian bankers do not need the widely held rule to protect them 
from foreign competition and have not needed its protections for a 
long time. The Canadian domestic banking market is relatively small 
and thoroughly controlled by the Schedule I institutions. The Cana-
dian banking market is an over-banked, mature market in which the 
big banks have long customer relationships and efficient operations.65 
Foreign competitors have recognized that the Canadian retail banking 
market is not worth fighting over.66 Although many U.S. banks main-
tain a presence in Canada, it is clear that they will never be major 
players there. 67 Yet the big Canadian banks do have something to fear 
from foreign competition. 
In the last two revisions of the Bank Ad, Parliament has imple-
mented commitments made under various trade agreements and 
expanded foreign access to the Canadian financial services market. In 
the traditional full-service retail banking segment, these more liberal 
access provisions are not particularly worrisome for Canadian banks 
because foreign financial service providers, including firms from the 
United States, have found it very difficult to establish profitable retail 
banking operations in Canada.68 From the point of view of potential 
new entrants, the Canadian banking market suffers from some serious 
disadvantages. First, it is a relatively small market, so creating a bank 
with real growth potential on the strength of only Canadian banking 
relationships is difficult, simply because the population of the country 
is too small. Second, the small market that exists is already adequately 
served by the banks, credit unions, and other intermediaries currently 
65. See James R. Kraus, Canada Plan Would Permit Cross-Border Branches, AM. BANKER, May 22, 
1997, at 22 (quoting Canadian banking experts who state that Canada has a technology and cost 
efficiency edge on U.S. banks resulting in lower spreads and the need for high volume to cover 
costs). 
66. See Aaron Elstein, Canada Bars 2 Megadeals, Sees Threat to Competition, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 
1998, at 1 (noting that market conditions discourage foreign buyers: "For all its size, Canada's 
population is slightly smaller than California's."). 
67. See WILLIAM R. WHITE, THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ITA AND NAFT A FOR CANADA AND MEXICO 
10 (1994). 
68. See id. (noting that foreign banks in Canada have failed to achieve rates of return on 
equity that even equal the return available from Canadian treasury bills). 
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in existence. There may not even be an unmet demand for banking 
services or a competitive opportunity sufficiently rich to be worthy of 
development. Third, like the rest of Canada's economy, Canada's 
banks are linked to natural resources and energy.69 Swings in those 
sectors affect the banking business as well. To address these problems, 
the Canadian banking industry has diversified its assets in overseas 
markets. 70 As with other sectors, the government has encouraged the 
export of financial services as a way to permit Canadian banks to 
continue to grow despite the constraints of the domestic market. 
Consequently, foreign financial service providers that have ventured 
into Canada have left the general banking market to the Canadian 
banks and instead have focused on exploiting niche businesses like 
credit cards and business lending. 71 This niche strategy is really just 
cream skimming-taking the profitable lines that used to belong to the 
Schedule I banks and leaving the unprofitable aspects of the Canadian 
banking market for the Canadian banks to maintain. 72 In the end, the 
profitable lines of business (and geographic regions) will see intense· 
competition, but the Schedule I banks will be saddled with a far-flung 
(and largely unprofitable) branch network that is no longer being 
subsidized by more lucrative banking business.73 
69. See ANDREW H. MALCOLM, THE CANADIANS 246 (1986). 
70. See Joseph Weber, Just Over the Horizon: North American Banks, A Few Rule Changes Could 
Bring a Wave of Cross-Border Mergers, Bus. WK., Feb. 23, 1998, at 100, 112 (noting that Canadian 
banks are looking south for growth). For example, the Bank of Montreal owns Harris Trust in the 
United States. See Drew Clark, Harris Marketers Look to a Mouse That Rnars, AM. BANKER,Jan. 7, 1998, 
at 14 (describing Bank of Montreal's plan to be the first true North American bank through its 
operations in Canada, Mexico, and the United States). Other Canadian banks also have substan-
tial operations throughout North America. See, e.g., Fluckiger, supra note 15, at 82 (describing the 
Mexican operations of Bank of Nova Scotia, and Bank of Montreal); Christopher]. Chipello & 
Carrick Mollenkamp, Rnyal Bank of Canada to Buy Centum In a Stock Deal Valued at $2.3 Billion, WALL 
ST.]., Jan. 29, 2001, at B2 (noting Royal Bank's acquisition of North Carolina-based Centura 
Banks, Inc.);James R. Kraus, A New Law Has U.S. Banks Looking to Mexico, AM. BANKER, Dec. 16, . 
1998, at 1 (noting Scotiabank's equity interest in Banco Inverlat). 
71. See CHARLES FREEDMAN & CLYDE GoODLET, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTOR: PAST CHANGES 
AND fuTURE PROSPECTS 25 (March 1998) (noting that the dominant position of Canada's banks will 
be challenged by "global" banks and niche players). See generally Harman, supra note 35 (giving a 
thorough overview of the various niche business strategies of the many foreign-owned banks 
operating in Canada) . 
72. See Elstein, supra note 66, at 30 (noting that MBNA has become a major player in credit 
card operations, Wells Fargo has gone after small business, and INC has made inroads in virtual 
banking). 
73. Of course the Canadian banks are well-run businesses, and the cream skimming of the 
new arrivals will not automatically result in loss of those lines of business. To date, even in niche 
markets, foreign concerns have encountered a fierce home court advantage in favor of the 
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But niche markets aside, no amount of maneuvering in Ottawa is 
going to make the Canadian general retail banking market more 
attractive to foreign entrants. The unattractiveness of the Canadian 
market is evidenced by the number of new entrants seeking to do 
business in Canada as Schedule I banks. In the period between 1987 
and 1999, Canada granted only two new Schedule I bank charters, 
while in the United States 207 new bank charters were issued in 1997 
alone?4 The government acknowledges that the lack of new entrants 
hurts consumer interests. 75 While some of the unattractiveness of 
starting a new Schedule I bank can be attributed to the legal restric-
tions on that kind of bank, even if the government changes the Bank 
Act to make entry easier, the economic situation may nevertheless 
preclude new entrants from venturing into a full service retail banking 
business in Canada. Therefore, while the retail banking market re-
mains firmly Canadian, Canadian bankers are nevertheless witnessing 
the end of their protectionist advantage as foreign competitors wrest 
away the most profitable lines of business. Industry players seem to be 
chafing at the protectionist bent of existing law,76 and that sentiment 
may presage a change in policy. 
B. There is a Political Quid Pro Quo that is no Longer 
a Good Deal for the Banks. 
The widely held rule has dampened competition in the banking 
market and allowed the big banks to operate without fear of foreign 
takeovers. Yet the protection has come at a price. For reasons that are 
more political then economic, the big Canadian banks maintain an 
extensive branch network across the country." Of course most of the 
rural branches do not pay for themselves, yet from a political point of 
view it is quite difficult to close a branch. For years, Canadian bankers 
have recognized that maintaining a branch system is a cost of doing 
business and that the banks' profitable lines of business have subsidized 
Canadians. For example, since Canada has permitted banks to acquire securities dealers as 
subsidiaries, all of lhe major Canadian securities dealers are now owned by banks, and all three 
U.S. brokerage firms with a presence in Canada in 1987 withdrew from the market by 1994. See 
WHITE, supra note 67, at 10. 
74. See Urquhart, supra note 55. 
75. See Schachter, Ottawa, supra note 52, at 29 (reporting on a government study that found 
the "lack of new entry is not in the best interest of Canadian consumers."). 
76. See Greenberg, supra note 40 (" [MJost bank chiefs themselves say the costs of preferential 
treatment outweigh the benefits."). 
77. Seeid. 
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their community banking activities in small towns across the country. 
From the perspective of banking law as social policy that cross-
subsidization is probably desirable,78 but from the bottom line point of 
view of running a business it is impractical.79 As foreign competitors 
skim off the profitable lines of business that subsidized the rural 
branches, banks feel the squeeze. 
In the CBA submission to the McKay Task Force, there is a long 
section that sets out to refute the perception that banks are "privileged 
institutions.,,8o The fact that the CBA felt compelled to spend thirteen 
pages of its submission refuting these allegations speaks volumes about 
the realpolitik of Canadian bank regulation. Perhaps because of their 
size and power, the Big Five Schedule I banks suffer from a negative 
public image.81 There is a perception that the widely held rule; foreign 
bank entry restrictions; the too big to fail doctrine; deposit insurance; 
access to the Bank of Canada as lender of last resort; and access to the 
payments system are special benefits bestowed on banks.82 On the 
political level, in exchange for the special treatment, banks must 
provide certain benefits to Canada, such as maintaining a nationwide 
bank system. While the public complains about the privilege end of the 
deal, the banking industry objects to the public benefit end of the deal. 
Banks are expected to extend an ever-increasing level of support for 
social programs as part of the quid pro quo for being a chartered 
bank.83 Indeed, the Schedule I banks complain that the banking system 
78. See MALCOLM, supra note 69, at 242 (1986) (noting the role that Canadian banks play in 
the community, and the opportunity for employment and social mobility afforded by banks in 
rural areas). 
79. See Information Morning: Interoiew with Proj Bernard M. Wolf on Bank Branch Closings (CBC 
One radio broadcast, July 31, 2000) (discussing with a professor from York University the 
economics of branch banking in light of announcements by the Bank of Nova Scotia that it will 
close some branches in rural locations). 
80. See CBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 43-56. 
81. See PETER C. NEWM1\N, TITA.'IS: How THE NEW CANADIAN ESTABLISHMENT SEIZED POWER 291 
(1998) (" ... the public perception is set in concrete: they are too big and too powerlul; they make 
huge profits and pay minimum taxes; they short-change small business, charge their customers 
extravagant fees, a~d would gladly tax sex if that would expand their already bloated bottom 
lines"); see also Simon Hally, Foodfor Thought, CAN. BANKER, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 5,5 (providing an 
interesting comparison between the respective public images of supermarkets and banks). 
82. See CBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 43-56. 
83. See Harvey Schachter, Beyond the Bottom Line, CAN. BANKER, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 24, 24; see 
also Banks, Social Groups Aim to Improve Availability of Seroices to the Poor, CAN. BANKER, Sept.-Oct. 
1996, at 8,8 (discussing the political pressure on banks to provide check cashing services or low 
cost accounts to the poor). 
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is being treated like a quasi-public utility.84 The banks would like to 
eliminate the widely held rule as part of a multi-prong attack on the 
privileged institution characterization. The ultimate goal of this attack 
is to end the political perception that banks owe the government 
certain favors, thereby relieving the political pressure on the big banks 
to be all things to all customers in all parts of Canada. This desire to be 
let out of the political deal that has bound the country, and the banking 
industry, for so long is merely symptomatic of the changing of the 
guard in Canada's business establishment from the old-line, clubby 
power brokers to a more bottom-line focused international group.85 
C. Lack of the Possibility of a Control Premium Increases the Cost of Capital. 
The widely held rule has been a statutory poison pill, in effect 
insulating Schedule I banks from hostile takeover and protecting the 
management of those banks from the operation of the market for 
corporate control. With surprising candor, the CBA admitted that one 
of the ill effects of the widely held rule is that it might make the 
management of Schedule I banks less attentive to market discipline.86 
The CBA also noted that the widely held rule has deprived the 
shareholders of Schedule I banks from ever receiving the value of the 
control premium for the shares of the bank.87 The control premium 
problem only received a one sentence bullet in the CBA's submission 
since an elaborate discussion of the issue would have only served to 
highlight the possibility that the banks will be sold to the highest bidder 
if the shares could be traded without restriction. Probably seeking to 
avoid such politically dangerous associations, the CBA submission 
skimmed over the control premium problem, but it deserves more 
attention. 
Research on U.S. corporate share prices shows that management 
implementation of a poison pill drives down share prices and therefore 
84. See CBA SUBMISSION, supra nbte 34, at 60 (stating that banks should be perceived by 
regulators as "responsible businesses, not public utilities"); Greenberg, supra note 40 (quoting A. 
Charles Baillie, chairman of Toronto-Dominion Bank, as saying "the public is treating us 
[Canada's big banks] more and more like quasi-public institutions."). 
85. See generally NEWMAN, supra note 81, at 276-338. 
86. See CBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 46. For a discussion of market discipline in the 
banking context, see Eric]. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market Discipline: How Much is Too Much?, 
16 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 311, 317-32 (1997) (providing an overview of the literature). 
87. See CBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 46. 
2001] 407 
LA W & POlley IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
increases the cost of capital.88 Other studies, using more recent data in 
which shareholder reaction has been informed by experience with the 
poison pill mechanism and perhaps an understanding that pills tend to 
result in negotiated takeovers with high 'premiums, however, tend to 
show an insignificant effect on stock price.89 The widely held rule, 
however, is more than just a shareholder rights plan adopted by and 
waiveable by a bank's board of directors-it is a statutorily imposed 
restriction that effectively precludes takeovers altogether and will not 
result in a higher-premium negotiated deal. Therefore, even if the 
research on garden variety poison pills indicates they are having little 
negative impact on share prices, the widely held rule nevertheless falls 
into a different category. 
There has been some research on the effect of statutory poison pills 
on share prices. In a study of the set of anti-takeover laws adopted in 
Ohio in the mid-1980s, researchers found that the corporations most 
susceptible to takeover bids incurred a loss in market value of approxi-
mately 4.5% after Ohio adopted its anti-takeover legislation.9o The 
Ohio legislation was more than just a poison pill, and seemed to be a 
message of governmental hostility to unwanted takeovers, thereby 
making a direct correlation specifically to the poison pill issue a bit 
tenuated. In any event, the widely held rule is probably better com-
pared to the Ohio statute study than to the studies of share price 
changes from firm-specific poison pills. 
If the lesson to be drawn from the statutory poison pill studies is that 
erecting obstacles to the realization of a control premium adversely 
affects stock price and therefore increases the cost of raising capital, 
88. See Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A Walking, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, 
Profitability, and Ownership Structure, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 347, 360-61 (1988) (finding adverse price 
movements of approximately one percent upon adoption of poison pill); Michael Ryngaert, The 
Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 377, 391 (1988) (noting smaller 
negative price adjustments). 
89. See, e.g., Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrent 
and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 19-21 (1995) (obseIVing that 
older studies found a negative impact on share prices from adoption of poison pills but that more 
recent adoptions have produced insignificant changes in stock price). 
90. Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry M. Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law, 
4J.L. ECON. & ORG. 373, 381-83 (1988) (showing a loss after the adoption of the legislation for 
publicly traded Ohio companies without large, i.e. in excess of 30%, shareholders); see also 
Michael Ryngaert & Jeffry M. Netter, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law Revisited: 
Its Real Effects, 6J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253 (1990) (responding to critics). But see Donald G. Margotta et 
aI., An Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 235, 
245-50 (1990) (challenging the assumptions and methodology of the Ryngaert and Netter study). 
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the widely held rule hurts Schedule I banks. The Schedule I banks are 
in need of capital to expand their operations both overseas and 
domestically, yet the price they must pay for that capital is artificially 
increased. The CBA state~ its concern over the effect of the widely held 
rule as a poison pill in terms of the inability of shareholders to realize a 
control premium, but the real problem is one for the banks' corporate 
treasurers in seeking additional capital. 
D. In an Era of Free Trade, Being too Closely Bound to the Canadian 
Market Hinders the Banks. 
Canada is and always has been a trading nation. Indeed, the 
Canadian banks understand that aggressive development of the 
international banking market is essential to their long-term health.91 
Yet as Canada pursues the ideal of free trade generally, it will also 
find that economic forces will deploy resources to more fully exploit 
areas in which Canada enjoys a comparative advantage. One can 
expect strong sectors such as mineral extraction and other staples-
long the mainstays of Canada's economy-to grow stronger, and 
weaker sectors, perhaps including the banking sector, to grow 
weaker.92 Because Canada's largest banks are hemmed in from 
growing through merger and acquisition, and because Canada has a 
policy that big banks shall not buy other big banks,93 it seems 
unlikely that Canadian banks will be able to hold their own against 
their larger foreign rivals in a world of reduced trade barriers, in 
which comparative advantage is translated into economic gain. 
Indeed, Canada's financial centers are already quite marginalized, 
91. See Geoffrey P. Dobilas, The Canadian Financial System in International Perspective, in CANADA 
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: THE GEOGRAPHY OF STRUCTURAL Al'lD TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 84, 94 
(John N.H. Britton ed., 1996) [hereinafter CANADA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY]; see also NEWMAN, 
supra note 81, at 30,g)6 (reporting on conversations with Peter C. Godsoe, Chairman of 
Scotiabank, concerning the necessity of Canadian banks to look internationally for opportuni-
ties). 
92. See Mel Watkins, Canadian Capitalism in Transition, in UNDERSTANDING CANADA: BUILDING 
ON THE NEW CANADIAN POUTICAL ECONOMY 19, 33 (Wallace Clement ed., 1997) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING CANADA] (noting the dynamic of comparative advantage in a free trade regime). 
93. Witness the refusal of the Finance Minister to permit the combination of Royal Bank and 
Bank of Montreal or the Toronto-Dominion Bank with CIBC. See Elstein, supra note 66, at 1 
(quoting Finance Minister Paul Martin as saying that Royal Bank of Canada's proposed merger 
with Bank of Montreal and Toronto-Dominion Bank's proposed merger with Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Commerce would "lead to an unacceptable concentration of economic power in the 
hands offewer, very large banks."). 
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surpassed by London, New York, Tokyo, and Hong Kong, where 
greater market depth, historical international orientation, larger 
players, and commitment to innovation leave Toronto, Montreal, 
and Vancouver at a distinct disadvantage.94 By some measures, the 
world is already passing by the Canadian banks. The big Canadian 
banks grow smaller by global standards with each passing year.95 
Citicorp alone has a bigger market capitalization than the Big Five 
combined.96 While the size of an institution is not necessarily a 
guarantee of business success, in the financial services marketplace 
size has some significance, especially in an area that Canadian banks 
have identified for growth: trade finance. 97 Canadian banks find 
their options for raising capital limited by their inability to sell out to 
a foreign banking organization; to be acquired by a large Gommer-
cia} concern; or even to give a substantial equity stake to another 
Canadian bank. If Canadian banks intend to continue pursuing the 
international activity they have initiated, they will need to find some 
way to increase the pool of capital on which they may draw.98 
Ironically, the widely held rule and the "big shall not buy big" 
doctrines-both of which are designed to maintain a truly "Canadian" 
banking system-are forcing Canadian banks to look to the United 
States for growth opportunities. The Canadian banks have recognized 
that domestic operations provide little room for growth, and have 
sought opportunities outside Canada.99 As Canadian banks expand 
their operations in the United States, what one observer has called the 
"Nortelization" of the Canadian banks may occur, whereby they main-
tain their nominal headquarters in Canada but become essentially U.S. 
businesses. 100 
94. See Dobilas, supra note 91, at 92. 
95. See Peter C. Newman, When the Banks Lost, Canada Lost, Too, MAcLEAN'S, Dec. 28, 1998, at 
76,76 (pointing out that Canada's banks rank between 70th and 80th worldwide in terms of size). 
96. See Deirdre McMurdy, The Globalization Game, MAcLEAN'S, Feb. 2, 1998, at 47,47. 
97. SeeJames R. Kraus, Swing to Import Finance Favoring Big Banks, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1998, 
at 20. But see FREEDMAN & GoODLET, supra note 71, at 17-21 (challenging the assertion that Canada 
needs large banks to stay competitive in the international market). 
98. See Dobilas, supra note 91, at 94. 
99. See Weber, supra note 70, at 112 (noting that Canadian banks are looking south for 
growth). 
100. See Eric Reguly, Feds Beware: The Nortelization of the Banks has Begun, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 
June 22, 2000, at B15 (observing that Royal Bank's acquisition of U.S.-based Liberty Insurance is 
evidence that the Canadian banking industry is taking its first steps toward 'Nortelization' (i.e., the 
process by which the banks, like Norte! Networks, retain headquarters in Canada but create most 
of the jobs south of the border». 
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E. Other Countries Could Retaliate Against Canada Citing a Lack of 
Reciprocity and Deny Canadian Acquisitions. 
The widely held rule may haunt Canadian banks seeking to acquire 
institutions in other countries. If banks in foreign countries are prohib-
ited from acquiring Canadian Schedule I banks, those countries might 
with good conscience throw barriers in the way of Canadian bank 
acquisition of their institutions as a matter of reciprocity. Because 
Canadian banks need to grow, and because Ottawa would prefer that 
they grow by acquiring banks in other countries, there could be very 
real pressure on Canada to bring its bank ownership rules into har-
mony with international norms. lOl Canada will face increasing pressure 
to liberalize trade restrictions and gain access to non-NAFfA mar-
kets. 102 Indeed, the regional trade blocks may end up in competition 
with one another and hopefully lead to further reductions in trade 
barriers.103 As trade in financial services plays an increasingly impor-
tant role in these trade pacts, the obstacles to unfettered cross-border 
activity will be subject to intense pressure. 
Finally, the North American banking industry inevitably will find 
itself subject to an increasing number of international agreements 
affecting the trade of services generally,104 and the regulation of 
banking in particular. Although multinational trading agreements 
covering industries as complicated as the financial services industry 
take a long time to evolve, on the regulation front, banking regulators 
have begun moving toward greater cooperation.105 
101. While the goal ofNAITA has never been the large scale harmonization oflegal regimes 
in North America, see Joel P. Trach UDan, Trade in Financial Services Under GA TS, NAFr A and the EC: 
A RegulataryJurisdictionAnalysis, 34 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37,94 (1995) (noting thatthe NAITA 
does not require financial regulation harmonization), Canada and Mexico often find themselves 
pushed in the direction of increased harmonization in any event. See supra note 44. 
102. For example, Canada (1996) and Mexico (1991) have already negotiated free trade 
agreements with Chile. GEORGE M. VON FURSTENBERG, THE BANKING Al,/D FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, 
supra note 31, at XIII (1997). 
103. One way to look at NAIT A is as a competitive response by the North American countries 
to the increased unification represente? by the European Union. 
104. For example, the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") effects on the 
international provision of banking services. See generally, Jeffrey Simser, GATS and Financial Services: 
Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 33, 40 (1996) (describing the structure of the GATS and its 
implications for the trade in financial services). 
105. See generally Joseph J. Norton, Trends in International Bank Supervision and the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 415 (1995) (summarizing some of 
the issues confronting the Bas\e Committee on Banking Supervision). 
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IV. REAsONS FOR RETAINING THE WIDELY HELD RULE 
. Given these arguments against the widely held rule, why does the 
new legislation propose only a liberalization of the rule instead of its 
outright elimination? The following section outlines several possible 
explanations. 
A. For Historical Reasons Involving Nation-Building and the Complicated 
u.S.-Canadian Relationship, the Widely Held Rule is a Necessary Evil. 
Given an incredibly wealthy endowment of land and natural re-
sources, but relatively few people and very little capital, early Canadian 
governments faced the daunting task of building a nation with the 
resources at hand, while holding off American expansion. With its 
relatively few people scattered across the continent, Canada's domestic 
market was small and often easily served from the United States. Faced 
with the challenges of a thin and dispersed market, together with the 
challenge of inventing a nation where no natural forces for nationhood 
existed, Canadian policymakers fashioned a distinctively Canadian 
form of business-government relationship. Explicit government poli-
cies designed to promote domestic enterprise typifY the traditional 
. Canadian business-government relationship, and the Canadian govern-
ment has long played an important role in shaping the economic 
landscape by providing a legal and policy framework conducive to 
economic growth. 106 Of course, although the Canadian government is 
not reluctant to use its power to protect domestic commercial concerns 
and promote domestic social goals such as full employment, Canada's 
economic policies cannot fairly be characterized under the "social 
market" model of the business-government relationship, the left-
leaning tendencies of the New Democratic Party notwithstanding.107 
106. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 53RD ANNUAL COUCHICHING CONFERENCE ON CANADA'S ECONOMIC 
FUTURE, FREE ENTERPRISE AND THE STATE: WHAT'S RIGHT? WHAT'S LEFT? WHAT'S NEXT?, at 100-04 
(1985) (comments of Maurice Strong). Canadian governmental agencies such as Industry Canada 
illustrate the sort of activist tendencies the Canadian government brings to the task of promoting 
national industrial policy aimed at creating jobs and boosting exports. For more information 
about Industry Canada, see Industry Canada home page, available at http://info.ic.gc.ca. 
107. The comments of the late J.C. Weldon, one of the intellectual leaders of the New 
Democratic Party ("NDP"), illustrate some of these social democratic tendencies. SeeJ.C. Weldon, 
An Academic's Perspective, in GoVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY-How MUCH? 45, 46 (Can. Found. for 
Econ. Educ. ed., 1977) [hereinafter GoVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY] (noting that the government 
"cannot sensibly avoid trying to determine the production and distribution of those goods the 
market cannot handle.") It should be noted that the NDP has never won control of the federal 
government. 
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Although Canada does provide benefits to its citizens and its businesses 
through economic intervention, those benefits are grafted onto an 
essentially liberal model, though not one exactly like those in the 
United States or Great Britain. lOs While the rise of conservatives in 
Canadian politics has pushed government policy in the direction of 
free trade,109 Canada remains politically committed to preserving its 
industrial policies. In part, this commitment springs from Canada's 
long history of disappointment with market forces that has left the 
country highly skeptical of laissez-faire policies. I 10 
One manifestation of government policy has been to minimize 
inter-provincial barriers to trade in the hope that national businesses 
could take root and thrive. Canada's banks benefited from that policy. 
The decision to permit nation-wide banking figured into the nation-
building strategy, and also made the most sense for pooling the little 
capital that was available. The Canadian banking industry consolidated 
early, creating a handful of nation-wide institutions that dominate the 
field today. Indeed, Canada's huge national banks are among the few 
truly national institutions in the country. II I 
But nothing in Canada's protectionist-leaning model of business-
government relations required the creation of the widely held rule. 
Indeed, Canada's banking industry developed very nicely prior to 1967 
without the benefit of the widely held rule. The widely held rule does 
not primarily serve to promote the development of the domestic 
banking industry and protect it from unfair competition from outside 
Canada. Instead, the widely held rule probably owes its existence to the 
most powerful force in Canadian economics, culture, and politics-the 
desire to be different from the United States. It is sometimes said that 
the only definition of Canada acceptable to all Canadians is that it is not 
108. See Judi th Maxwell, The Role of Government: Searchingfor a Balance, in GoVER1'iMENT Al'iD THE 
ECONOMY, supra note 107, at 37,37; Preface, In Search Of Canada, at vii, viii (Stephen R. Graubard 
ed., 1989) [hereinafter IN SEARCH OF CA,"IADAj ("Canada is not simply a version of other modem 
industrial societies. While it owes much to Great Britain, France, and the United States, it is not 
like any of them; this is a fact too rarely acknowledged.") 
109. See Watkins, supra note 92, at 33 (noting that free trade was the core policy of the 
Canadian right wing). . 
110. See MALCOLM, supra note 69, at 27 ("In part because of the failure of market forces to 
provide a balance of economic opportunities within the country, Canadians throughout their 
history have remained basically suspicious of a laissez-faire marketplace."). 
Ill. See id. at 241. Like every nation, Canada has its own set of national images, legends, and 
myths, some of which are in national institutions. See generally DANIEL FRANCIS, NATIONAL DREAMS: 
MYTH, MEMORY, AND CANADIAN HISTORY (1997) (deconstructing such cherished Canadian institu-
tions as the Canadian Pacific Railroad and the RCMP). 
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the United States. The looming presence of its huge southern neighbor 
informs many policy choices, including banking policy. 
Because Canada is a trading nation, in an ideal world it would 
embrace free trade principles in every aspect of its economic policy, 
including trade in financial services. In the real world, however, Can-
ada must be constantly aware of what the United States is doing.1l2 
Much of Canadian industry consists of the Canadian operations of U.S. 
firms, yet Canada bridles at the prospect of "branch plant" capitalism 
that places Canada in a subservient role. Canadians constantly debate 
the appropriate extent of foreign investment in Canada and the power 
of multinational corporations. 113 Many sense a threat to Canadian 
sovereignty as economic power shifts to corporate headquarters in the 
United States and Great Britain. 114 
Consequently, Canada historically has employed strategic protection-
ist policies to insulate its banking industry from U.S. domination. 115 
The political reality of foreign dominance in the Canadian economy 
has pushed banking policy in the direction of protecting the core of the 
Canadian banking system from foreign domination, not because the 
Canadian banks need protection from competition, but rather because 
the government fears what might happen to national self image and 
pride if the largest institutions were to cease being Canadian and 
become mere branch offices of foreign financial giants. 
112. See David H. Flaherty, Who Rules Canada?, in IN SEARCH OF CANADA, supra note 108, at 99, 
115 ("Canada also views the exercise of its power in the context of relations with the United States. 
The argument of political economists is that economic and cultural realities severely limit 
Canada's ability to exercise its independence .... "). 
113. See id. at 114 ("Another way to understand the limits of political and economic power in 
Canada is to consider the international forces that have an impact on its use. An argument can be 
constructed that Canada is ruled from abroad and/or by forces of international capitalism."). 
114. See REpORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 181-209 (1978), 
reprinted in THE DEVELOPMENT OF CANADIAN CAPITALISM: ESSAYS IN BUSINESS HISTORY 278-308 
(Douglas McCalla ed., 1990). 
115. A deliberate policy to contain U.S. influence in the economy has been part and parcel of 
Canadian· banking since the first bank in the country, the Bank of Montreal, was chartered in 
1821. Its charter, the charter of all nineteenth century banks thereafter, and Canada's national 
banking legislation up through the mid-1980s, restricted bank directorships to British subjects. 
Some banks imposed additional residency requirements. See GoRDON LAxER, OPEN FOR BUSINESS: 
THE ROOTS OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN CANADA 216 (1989) (providing a brief history of the British 
subject clause). 
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B. Canadian Policy makers Have a Legitimate Fear of Undue Concentration 
in the Canadian Banking Industry. 
Canada already has a very concentrated banking market. A handful 
of nation-wide institutions control the lion's share of the market. The 
widely held rule may help keep the concentration of economic power 
in check to some degree. Of course, the banks as institutions can 
exercise immense power over the Canadian economy, but the widely 
held rule ensures that the banks themselves are not owned by a mere 
handful of private shareholders. The widely held rule combats concen-
tration on the ground that it would not be good for the Canadian 
economy, regardless of whether that tiny, powerful group owning the 
banks is composed of foreigners or Canadians. 
C. The Public Choice Explanation: Rent-Seeking Reg;ulators will not 
Voluntarily Relinquish Their Tuif. 
Like regulators everywhere, Canadian bank regulators are not willing 
to give up their regulatory power without a fight. This fact of life was 
illustrated during the negotiation of both the V.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement and NAFTA, when it was widely ,understood that Canada 
opposed cross-border branching in part due to the desire of Canadian 
banking regulators that there be a Canadian bank that they could 
regulate. 1l6 Canadians also resented what they considered to be the 
propensity of V.S. regulators to seek extraterritorial application of V.S. 
law.1l7 The turf war mentality is consistent with a public choice view of 
the world, which sees regulators as managers who seek to maximize the 
value of their enterprises. llS If Canada's banks were no longer subject 
to the widely held rule, some or all of them might be taken over by 
non-Canadian concerns, which would have the effect of paring away 
some of the current regulatory load of the Canadian banking regula-
tors who are primarily responsible for the banks chartered within their 
116. SeeJordan, supra note 2, at 48 (voicing the opinion that the Canadian trade negotiators 
did not yield to the pressures to permit U.S. branches because "Canadian regulators ... wished to 
ensure that there was a Canadian entity to be regulated."). 
117. See id. (noting that "Canadian regulators do not indulge in the extraterritorial applica-
tion of Canadian banking laws"); see also CBA SUBMISSION, supra note 34, at 44 (noting the use of 
the widely held rule as a tool for restricting extraterritorial application of U.S. law). 
118. See Edward]. Kane, Tension Between Competition and Coordination in International Financial 
Regulation, in GoVERNING BANKING'S F\ITURE: MARKETS VS. REGUI.ATION 33, 34 (Catherine England 
ed., 1991) [hereinafter GoVERNING BANKING'S F\ITURE] (describing the need for regulators to 
maximize the value of their enterprise within the confines of something he calls the "microeco-
nomic analysis of regulation," which is consistent with the public choice view). 
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respective territories. 1l9 The banking regulators who have a vested 
interest in the current system will not give up their authority without a 
fight. 
Yet while Canadian banking regulators necessarily must worry about 
domestic policy matters, they also must contend with the more difficult 
problem of international regulatory competition.120 Viewing the mar-
ket for regulation as a dynamic international marketplace, if Canada is 
too far out of step with other countries, the Canadian banking regula-
tors will lose market share to other more flexible banking regimes. In 
order to maintain their regulatory enterprise, Canadian bank regula-
tors will continue to feel pressure to harmonize Canadian law with the 
larger North American regulatory scheme. The concept of regulatory 
emulation is one such pressure urging change,121 but ,more subtle 
pressures also exist. The mere existence of cross-border commerce, 
combined with increased contact between policy-makers and business 
people, will likely lead to the adoption of the "best" policies if only 
because that is what the market for regulation demands.122 Indeed, in 
the securities arena, U.S. and Canadian regulators already have achieved 
considerable harmonization of federal, state, and provincial securities 
regulation. 123 To the extent competition for customers between securi-
ties firms and banks is skewed in favor of securities firms because of the 
greater harmonization, Canadian bankers may mobilize additional 
119. Subsidiaries are regulated primarily in thejurisdiction in which they are chartered. The 
regulation of branches is more complicated: for prudential matters, such as capital levels and 
management competence, the home country regulator haS priority, but for market matters, the 
host country regulates. See Michael G. Martinson, Consolidated Supervision of Cross-Border Banking 
Activities: Principles and Practice in the NAFrA Context, in REGUlATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES AND BEYOND, 217, 217 (George M. von Furstenberg ed., 
1997) [hereinafter FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES]. 
120. See Kane, supra note 118, at 34 ("individual regulatory enterprises are in competition 
with each other for whatever it is they maximize."). 
121. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
122. See generally Alfred C. Arnan,] r., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms: Rejection, 
Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 IND.]. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995) (arguing that global political 
and economic forces push national policies towards various forms of deregulation and privatiza-
tion); Stephen Zamora, NAFrA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side r:jJects of Free 
Trade, 12 ARIz. ]. INT't. & COMPo L. 401 (1995) (arguing that increased cross-border contact 
between businesspeople, bureaucrats, lawyers, academics, and others will inevitably lead to an 
exchange of ideas and accommodation in each of the three countries of the cultural differences of 
the others). 
123. See]ordan, supra note 2, at 53 (noting that the Canadian scheme of securities regulation 
is modeled after the U.S. scheme and that the regulators have achieved considerable integration). 
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political resources to put pressure on their regulators to ease off on the 
widely held rule. 
On the other hand, given the effects of path dependence and the 
different initial conditions of banking policy in Canada, even if liberal-
ization and competition create some pressure for the convergence of 
banking regulatory schemes in the NAFT A countries, that convergence 
is likely to be incomplete. Where key decision makers are also rent 
receivers in the existing system and can block change, the existing 
system will tend to persist. 124 So, even with the pressures for greater 
North American harmonization and integration, Canadian regulators 
may still have room to maneuver to stake out distinctly Canadian 
policies,125 perhaps including a domestic ownership requirement. 
D. Policymakers Misapprehend the Importance of Economies of Scale. 
Canadian banking policy is founded on the premise that economies 
of scale 126 are important and fundamental to the viability of banks. 
Because Canada's population is so thin and spread out, Canada has 
never sought to hem in its banking institutions within provincial or 
regional lines. Instead it was understood early on that in order to 
obtain critical mass, Canadian banks needed to be as large as possible 
to establish a sizeable pool of capital in a nation with such a small 
population. The scale economy strategy worked in establishing a strong 
and viable commercial banking industry in Canada. Today, however, 
124. See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark]. Roe, A Theory of Path Depmdence in Corporate Ownership and 
Gauernance, in CORPORATE GoVER1'IANCE TODAY 575,585-96 (Mark]. Roe ed., 1998) (describing the 
view that difference in corporate governance might persist provided that the costs of a Coasian 
bargain are not trivial) [hereinafter CORPORATE GoVERNANCE TODAY]; see also Lawrence]. White, 
Competition Versus Harmonization-An Overview of International Regulation of Financial Services, in 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: HARMONIZATION VERSUS COMPETITION 5, 10-12 (Claude E. 
Barfield ed., 1996) [hereinafter iNTER1'lATIONAL FINAl\lCIAL MARKETS] (providing an overview of the 
competition versus harmonization debate). But see]. Mark Ramseyer, Are Corporate Governance 
Systems Converging?, in CORPORATE GoVER1'lANCE TODAY 537,545-48 (1998) (arguing that systems of 
successful firms ilre shaped by economic logic and, over time, different systems will tend to 
converge). 
125. See generally George Hoberg, Canada and North American Integration, 26 CAN. PUB. POL'y, 
at S-35 (2000) (surveying studies of North American integration and finding that the conse-
quences of North American integration have not been as formidable as widely believed and noting 
that Canadian policymakers still have room to create policy even in areas highly affected by 
economic integration). 
126. When a firm's average cost of production decreases as its level of output increases, 
economies of scale exist. See Loretta J. Mester, Efficimt Production of Financial Services: Scale and Scope 
of&onomies, FED. REs. BANK OF PHILA. Bus. REv.,Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 15,16. 
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Canadian regulators arid Canadians generally may be too impressed 
with the idea of economies of scale to let go of the widely held rule. 
Intuitively, it seems obvious that economies of scale, at least on the 
product-specific level, should exist in banking.127 But the existence of 
important scale economies in banking generally is not taken as gospel. 
The banking industry generally mayor may not exhibit such econo-
mies.128 Recent studies have concluded that moderate to substantial 
127. As an example, in order to produce consumer loans, banks must invest in a certain 
amount oflegal work, form preparation, training, record keeping, and other start up costs. Banks 
incur these costs irrespective of the number of loans actually made. Because there is a large 
fixed-£ost start-up expense, the average cost per loan should decrease as a function of the number 
of loans made because the start up cost will be spread over a larger number of loans. Therefore, 
the bank that produces more consumer loans should, all things being equal, be able to produce 
those loans at a lower average cost than its less productive competitor. Indeed, some studies have 
tended to show that some product-specific economies of scale do exist. See Peter Maloney, Merging 
Trust operations, U.S. BANKER, June I, 1989, at 37, 37-38 (finding that banks can capitalize on 
significant economies of scale by combining trust departments in one operational unit);John P. 
Mara, The New Economics of Martgaging, MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar. 1989, at 89, 89-94 (reporting that 
evidence suggests technologically induced economies of scale exist in mortgage banking and 
servicing and do not diminish until volumes reached about $2.5 billion). More recent studies have 
specifically investigated whether the production of consumer loans, which have high regulatory 
compliance costs, display scale economies. One study found substantial economies of scale in 
compliance with the regulatory burden. Larger banks spent more on compliance than smaller 
banks, but a 5.7% change in compliance cost was accompanied by a 10% change in the amount of 
_ credit extended. See Neil B. Murphy, Economies of Scale in the Cost of Compliance with Consumer Credit 
Protection Laws: The Case of the Implementation of the Equal Credit Dppartunity Act of 1974, 10 J. BANK 
REs. 248, 250 (1980). But see GREGORY ELUEHAUSEN & ROBERT D. KURTZ, BOARD OF GoVERNORS OF 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEM, .SCALE ECONOMIES AND COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR CONSUMER CREDIT 
REGULATION: TRUTH-IN-LENDING A..'IID EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY LAws, Staff Study number 144, at 
1 n.3 (1985) (criticizing the Murphy study because it was based on a very small sample of banks 
and evaluated the costs of compliance at the very outset of Regulation B's existence, so that the 
data might not reflect long run compliance costs). 
128. Although researchers have studied the existence of economies of scale in the banking 
industry, the results of those studies do not paint a clear picture. The earliest empirical studies of 
economies of scale tended to show that scale economies in banking were relatively unimportant. 
Richard W. Nelson, Economies of Scale v. Regulation as Determinants of u.s. Banking Structure, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUcruRE AND COMPETITION 462, 463 (1983) [hereinafter 
BANK STRUcruRE AND COMPETITION]. Studies during the 1960's, however, found significant 
economies of scale in the banking industry. FREDERICK W. BELL & NEIL B. MuRPHY, ECONOMIES OF 
SCALE IN COMMERCIAL BANKING 8-9 (1967) (analyzing data obtained in 1965, showed that unit costs 
declined significantly as banks expandt;d operations); George J. Benston, Economies of Scale and 
Marginal Costs in Banking operations, 2 NAT'L BANKING REv. 507,541 (1965) (using data from the 
early 1960s concluding that economies of scale were observed in each of several different banking 
services analyzed). Studies in the 1970s and 1980s evaluating the existence of overall economies of 
scale i,n the banking industry almost unanimously concluded that economies of scale either did 
not exist or were exhausted for the most part 'by the time banks reach the asset size rang~ of $25 
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economies of scale may exist in the banking industry. 129 Recent studies 
of scale economies in banking seem to point to a number of conclu-
sions: (1) within banking organizations scales of economy are modest; 
(2) with regard to specific high volume products such as credit cards 
and checking accounts, the scales of economy may be significant; and 
(3) large money center banks do appear to enjoy a cost economy in that 
they can attract capital at a lower cost than their competitors. 130 As 
discussed above, the cost of capital for Schedule I banks is artificially 
increased because of the poison pill effect of the widely held rule, so 
one of the possible benefits for large banks-attracting capital at lower 
cost-is counterbalanced by other effects of Canadian law. 
Despite the evidence that economies of scale are not the most 
powerful economic force in the banking industry, in the Canadian 
context, policyrnakers and the general public may harbor the concern 
that the banking sector could have such significant economies of scale 
that large international banking organizations inevitably will come to 
dominate the market. 131 Even though the data do not support that 
conclusion, the perception of a threat is as good as a threat for political 
million- $100 million. See GeorgeJ. Benston et al., Economies of Scale and Scope in Banking, in BANK 
STRUcnJRE AND COMPETITION, supra, at 432, 452 (concluding that there are no overall scales of 
economy above low output levels); Jeffery A. Clark, Economies of Scale and Scope at Depositary 
Financial Institutions: A Review of the Literature, FED. REs. BANK OF KANSAS CI1Y ECON. REv., Sept.-Oct. 
1988, at 26 (reviewing 13 empirical studies and finding that overall economies of scale appear to 
exist only at low levels of output, while diseconomies of scale appear at large output levels). See also 
A. Sinan Cebenoyan, Multi-Product Cost Functions and Scale Economies in Banking, 23 FIN. REv. 499 
(1988); Thomas Gilligan & Michael Smirlock, An Empirical Study of Joint Production and Scale 
Economies in Commercial Banking, 8]. BANKING & FIN. 67, 67-77 (1984) (finding scale economies in 
small banks, but diseconomies in large banks). 
129. See, e.g., Joseph P. Hughes & Loretta]. Mester, Bank Capitalization and Cost: Evidence of 
Scale Economies in Risk Management and Signalling, 80 REv. ECON. AND STAT. 314 (1998) (finding 
substantial scale economies); Joseph P. Hughes et aI., Efficient Banking Under Interstate Branching, 
28]. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 1045 (1996) (finding relatively large scales of economy that 
increase with size and geographic diversity); Stravos Peristiani, Do Mergers Improve the X-Efficiency of 
u.s. Banks? Evidence From the 1980s, 29]. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 326 (1997) (acquiring banks 
experienced moderate improvements in scale efficiency relative to a control group). 
130. See PETER S. ROSE, BANKING ACROSS STATE LINES: PUBLIC A;'1D PRIVATE CONSEQUENCES 
106-07 (1997) (discussing economy of scale studies); see also Patrick H. McAllister & Douglas 
McManus, Resolving the Sale Efficiency Puzzle in Banking, 17 ]. BANKING AND FIN. 389 (1993) 
(examining returns to scale generally and finding significant scale economies for banks below 
about $500 million in assets, but also finding significant cost advantage for big banks over smaller 
banks for financial capital, thereby negating any diseconomies of scale in pure operating costs). 
131. Of course the data do not support clearly the contention that large banks enjoy 
economies of scale. Hence, the predictions of the demise of the small community bank appear to 
be greatly exaggerated. See generally DONALD R. FRASER & JAMES W. KOlAR!, THE FUTURE OF SMALL 
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purposes; populist forces in. Canada may rail against eliminating the 
widely held rule on the theory that by dint of economics alone, U.S. 
money center banks or other global banking behemoths will squeeze 
Canadian banks of all sizes out of the competitive picture entirely. 
E. Policy makers may Sincerely Believe that Forcing the Banks to be Canadian 
is Actually Good for Them. 
It is possible that the pOlicy makers think they kno\y what is best for 
Canada's banks, and will impose this blessing on Canadian bankers 
whether they want it or not. First, Canadian banks enjoy a significant 
safety net subsidy, and one which is probably higher than the "safety net 
subsidy" bestowed by many other countries on their banks. The size of 
the subsidy is a function of the strength of the government's commit-
ment to the stability of the banking system, characterized by the 
credibility of government support for failing banks, the availability of 
deposit insurance, the availability of a lender of last resort, and bank 
access to a risk-free payments system. I32 Canada's safety net subsidy is 
apparently large by international standards. Canadian regulators may 
understand the limitations of the widely held rule, but reason that as a 
package of legislation that protects Canadian banks, it actually bestows 
a generous subsidy on them for which they should be grateful and 
which they can use for good competitive effect in the international 
banking market. 
In the international setting, however, such an argument misses the 
mark because all important banking countries bestow some form of 
systemic default guarantee that acts to protect depositors and subsidize 
banks. I33 The mere existence of such a subsidy does not explain one 
country's competitive success in the banking market vis-a.-vis banks 
from other countries, but rather success is more likely determined by a 
combination of "comparative advantage, the fundamentals of each 
economy, together with governmental support in the form of safety net 
BJU'IKS IN A DEREGULATED ENVIRONMENT (1985); Paul Nadler, Lending Strategies: Why the Community 
Bank Thrives, 1 COM. LENDING REv. 71 (1986). 
132. See Reforms Needed for Financial Services to Rourish Says CBA, CANADA NEWSWIRE, Oct. 29, 
1997, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Canada NewsWire File (reporting on CBA report that urges reevalua-
tion of the "special privilegesn accorded to Canadian banks, such as deposit insurance, liquidity 
support from the Bank of Canada, and access to the payment system). 
133. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R Macey, A Public Choice Model of International 
&onomic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDozo L. REv. 925,931 (1996). 
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policies.,,134 On the international level, the important question to ask is 
"how big is one subsidy compared to the subsidies provided by the 
other countries?,,135 
In the United States, banks have rebutted the safety net subsidy 
argument by pointing out that any benefits conferred are offset by the 
costs incurred to obtain those benefits such as compliance with capital 
requirements, payment of deposit insurance premiums, and regulatory 
restrictions. 136 In Canada, however, one might surmise from the lighter 
regulatory burden 137 and the much lower failure rate of Canadian 
banks that the net subsidy to Canadian banks exceeds the U.S. subsidy 
and could be a credible benefit that the regulators sincerely believe 
helps Canadian banks. 
Second, being Canadian gives the Schedule I banks an advantage in 
the world marketplace. In the global marketplace for financial services, 
perhaps the biggest advantage to Canadian banks is that they are not 
134. HAL S. SCOrf & SHINSAKU IWAHARA, IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD: THE IMPLEMEN-
TATION OF THE BASLE CAPITAL ACCORD INJAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES I (1994). 
135. It appears from the available evidence, for example, that the safety net subsidy enjoyed 
by Japanese banks is greater than the subsidy bestowed upon U.S. banks. See generally id. (noting 
the relative stability of Japanese banks generally compared to U.S. banks and noting that creditors 
will demand higher interest rates from U.S. banks because the overall risk oflending to U.S. banks 
is higher). 
136. See J aret Seiberg, Banks' Plea To Fed: Stop Saying We're Subsidized, AM. BANKER, Nov. 5, 1997, 
at I; Bert Ely, Greenspan s Deposit Insurance Subsidy Argument Is Nonsense, AM. BANKER,June 6, 1997, at 
3 (stating that deposit insurance has never cost taxpayers a cent, loans from the discount window 
must be collateralized and the small risk of intraday overdraft risk can be minimized by proper 
management and concluding there is no meaningful subsidy); see also John D. Hawke, Jr., 
Reflections on the Ongoing Effort to Modernize Financial Services Regulation, 49 MERCER L. REv. 777, 779 
(1998) (expressing skepticism of the existence of a net subsidy); Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Helfer, 
Ludwig Insist DepOSit Insurance Doesn't Give Banks an Unfair Advantage, AM. BANKER, Mar. 6, 1997, at 2 
(recounting the testimony of Comptroller of the Currency Eugene Ludwig and Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Chairman Ricki Helfer that the Fed's subsidy argument is incorrect 
because it does not take regulatory compliance costs into account). 
137. There is a significant difference between U.S. and Canadian banks in terms of the 
regulatory burden shouldered by each. As a telling illustration, in the early 1990s there were an 
estimated 220,000 pages of U.S. banking law and regulation at the federal level (not including 
state level regulation), while in Canada the entire Bank Act and associated regulations amounted 
to no more than 530 pages. SeeJohn C. Pattison, Trade in Financial Services in NAfTA: A Public Choice 
Approach, REGULATION AND SUPERVISION, supra note 31, at 145,148-49. Another explanation for the 
difference is the willingness of Canada's banks to adopt voluntary guidelines in order to prevent 
the need for legislated solutions to perceived problems. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK 
OVERSIGHT STRUCTURE: U.S. AND FOREIGN EXPERIENCE MAy OFFER LESSONS FOR MODERNIZING U.S. 
STRUCTURE 72 (1996) (noting the voluntary adoption by Canadian banks of consumer and small 
business lending guidelines to prevent legislative solutions). 
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U.S. banks. In a world where some international borrowers may have 
political difficulties borrowing from the United States, Canada stands 
ready to serve their needs. In addition, Canadian banks have access to 
relatively low cost U.S. dollars because much trade in Canada is 
conducted in U.S. dollars, often purchased at a discount from market 
prices. 138 The combination of not being American, yet having access to 
U.S. dollars, gives Canadian banks an edge vis-a.-vis other non-U.S. 
banks in dealing in dollar-denominated assets, especially in areas such 
as oil and mineral extraction, where they have great expertise. 
F. Canada Needs Some Large Banks under its Jurisdiction to Help in the 
Implementation of Social and Governmental Goals. 
Finally, Canada may need the widely held rule simply because having 
some substantial Canadian banks is important for the implementation 
of government policies. Indeed, some bankers have supported the rule 
on essentially protectionist grounds, arguing that lifting the widely held 
rule would jeopardize the Canadian banking industry and important 
national objectives. 139 The implied argument supporting the protection-
ist position is that as long as the largest domestic banks are Canadian, 
they will continue to serve national interests, especially the implementa-
tion of monetary policy, the provision of credit throughout the coun-
. try, and the generation of jobs. Job growth in the financial services 
sector is strong. From 1995 to 1997,jobs in the financial services sector 
grew 5.1 %, compared to 3.9% for the economy generally. In a country 
with chronic employment problems, an industry that creates new jobs is 
very valuable. 
In addition, banking regulators can cite legitimate public policy 
problems that weigh in favor of maintaining a domestic banking 
industry, including the need to protect bank customers and investors 
from asymmetric information problems, guard against systemic failure, 
and work toward fair trade. There is, therefore, some force to the 
position that regulators should retain the right to fashion their own 
domestic regulatory scheme. 14o 
138. See MALCOLM, supra note 69, at 155 ("Canadian stores almost anywhere routinely accept 
United States currency, though at an exchange rate that certainly benefits the home team."). 
139. See Robert Gibbens, National Bank Likes Status Quo, THE FIN. POST, Mar. 12, 1998, at 5 
(quoting Andre Berard, chairman of National Bank of Canada: "The 10% limit ... cannot be 
traded away on the altar of competition and globalization ... [gliving way would mean foreign 
control of our big banks and that's unacceptable."). 
140. See Jean Dermine, International Tmde in Banking, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS, 
supra note 124, at 49, 70 (reaching conclusion that some autonomy in domestic regulation is 
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IV. OPTIONS FOR CANADIAN BANKS UNDER THE NEW WIDELY HELD RULE 
On balance, it appears as though the widely held rule is here to 
stay-at least for the foreseeable future. That being the case, what 
options are available for Canadian banks under the new widely held 
rule? Several thoughts (by no means covering the entire topic) are 
discussed below. 
A. Maintain the Status Quo. 
Mter the proposed changes to the widely held rule become effective, 
Canadian banks do not have to do anything differently from the way 
they have done things in the past. The new widely held rule continues 
to supply a statutory poison pill for Canada's largest banks, making 
hostile acquisition virtually impossible. Therefore, the managers of 
Canada's largest banks can stay in their current positions without 
worrying about losing their jobs. But if they follow that course of action, 
the rest of the world market will proceed without them. 
Although Canada's banking sector has a solid history of good perfor-
mance domestically and a real presence in international trade fi-
nance,141 they are not growing as quickly as their international competi-
tors. Staying put will only insure the increasing irrelevance of the 
Canadian banking industry. 
B. Seek a Strategic Alliance with a Canadian Bank. 
In response to the proposed mergers in 1998 involving four of the 
Big Five, Ottawa sent a message that "big shall not buy big."142 Yet, it 
may be possible that the liberalized widely held rule could permit 
domestic institutions to take twenty percent stakes in each other and 
enter into strategic alliances that would permit some joint operations 
that are susceptible to scale economies, such as a consolidation of their 
branch networks and back office operations. Indeed, three of the Big 
Five already have engaged in a joint effort to consolidate data process-
necessary to address problems of asymmetric information, systemic failure, and fair trade 
problems, but going on to consider whether the best approach in the international context should 
be national treatment or reciprocity). 
141. See Elena Cherney, Canada's Five Big Banks Report Higher Profits, WALL ST.J.,June 2, 2000, 
at A6 (reporting strong earnings from Canada's largest banks in part due to cost cutting and niche 
global expansion). 
142. See Eistein, supra note 66, at 1. 
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ing. 143 Assuming such investments would be permitted by the Finance 
Minister, the alliances so created could provide cost savings and 
functionally larger banks, even while retaining the separate legal 
organization of each institution. 
C. Seek a Strategic Alliance with a U. S. Bank. 
Recognizing that the U.S. market provides the most opportunities 
for growth, big Canadian banks might look south to form strategic 
alliances. Of course, some Canadian banks already have substantial 
operations in the United States/44 but short of outright acquisition 
Canadian banks could also participate in joint ventures. Canadian 
banks possess a good deal of knowledge about retail banking opera-
tions and trade finance. An ideal U.S. partner would be one with an 
interest in remaining independent, with an international portfolio and 
access to low cost funding sources. It would not be outside of the realm 
of possibility, for instance, to imagine a strategic alliance between 
Scotiabank and FleetBoston. The two institutions are linked by the 
history of significant trade ties between the Maritimes and New En-
gland, by the proximity of their regions of origin, and by their business 
strategies-with strengths in retail banking, small business lending, 
and trade finance. From Scotiabank's point of view, FleetBoston would 
give it access to a much deeper pool of resources and allow it to 
generate bigger credits through pre-arranged loan participation. From 
FleetBoston's perspective, it would obtain a proven worldwide trade 
finance player to help put its resources to work, the benefits of loan 
participation and immediate access throughout Canada. Together the 
two banks get a much stronger worldwide presence a.nd an increased 
opportunity to engage in project finance and other large:"scale activity 
not available to them now. 
The form of such a strategic alliance might include the following 
points: (1) each bank takes a sizeable equity position in the other, 
limited by applicable law; (2) they sign a mutual defense pact in which 
they give each other the right to buy additional shares on favorable 
terms if the other is subject to an unsolicited offer (even though 
143. SeeJim Lyon, How Technology Transforms Banking, CAN. BANKER, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 18, 20 
(discussing the joint venture Symcor Services Inc., formed in 1996 by Bank of Montreal, Royal 
Bank, and Toronto Dominion Bank in order to compete with U.S. providers of back office 
operations) . 
144. For example, Bank of Nova Scotia is one of the leaders in syndicated loans in the United 
States. See Diane Maley, Building the Bank of the Future, CAN. BANKER,Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 21,23; see also 
supra note 70. 
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currently that would not be such an important matter for the Canadian 
institution); and (3) they enter into a plan for coordinated interna-
tional business involving consolidation of redundant resources and an 
agreement for loan participation. Such an alliance could prove mutu-
ally beneficial in the brave new world of global financial services. 
D. Seek a Strategic Alliance with a Non-U.S. Bank. 
Although U.S. affiliation might make sense, there is some value to 
not being American. 145 While Canada has long and strong ties with the 
United States, it also has ties to England, Scotland, Ireland, and France, 
among other nations. Banking institutions in those countries seeking 
expansion in North America could do so on ajoint venture basis with a 
Canadian bank and achieve the same advantages described above, . 
especially with banks that already have substantial U.S. operations, such 
as Bank of Montreal. 
E. Acquire Other Institutions in an Attempt to Become 
Too Big to be Acquired. 
One way for Canadian banks to plan for the future and remain 
distinctly Canadian would be to use the higher permissible ownership 
level to acquire other institutions using the bank's stock as consider-
ation. Indeed, this was one of the reasons for the proposal to increase 
the ownership limit from ten percent to twenty percent.146 The goal of 
this strategy would be to grow so large that if the widely held rule is ever 
eliminated, the bank would be too big to be acquired. This is likely to 
be a flawed strategy because it is increasingly difficult to imagine an 
institution that is too big to be acquired. The huge combinations in the 
United States between Travelers and Citicorp, Bank of America and 
NationsBank, and BankersTrust and Deutsche Bank make this strategy 
a long shot. Given where the Canadian banks are starting out, they 
would have a long way to go before achieving the requisite size to be 
truly unacquirable. 
145. See MALCOLM, supra note 69, at 197 (Canada is "notably free of the political and 
ideological baggage often attached to such deals by the Americans. While remaining inextricably 
tied to the United States economically, politically, and militarily, Canadians had become skillfully 
adept at appearing to be separate from the Yanks."). 
146. See Urquhart, supra note 55 (noting that some bankers believe the relaxed restrictions 
will help them make acquisitions by allowing them to issue larger amounts of stock to sellers of 
acquisition targets). 
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v. CONCLUSION 
The Mexican experience may, in the end, prove instructive for 
Canadian banking policy. Market forces have proven to be almost 
irresistible in causing changes in the bank regulatory scheme. Mexico 
wanted to protect its banks, but in the end realized it could not do so. 
Canada may reach the same conclusion. 
The widely held rule made sense in the context of the highly 
nationalistic, somewhat paranoid, undoubtedly anti-American period 
of the late 1960s. As we move further from that time, the rule is 
increasingly out of sync with global free trade norms. Like many 
protectionist measures before it, the rule may ultimately hurt the banks 
it was designed to promote. The big Canadian banks are chafing under 
the widely held rule. They want to be free of the political quid pro quo 
that comes with protection and they want their shareholders to be able 
to receive a control premium from the sale of a Canadian bank on the 
open market. 
On the other hand, the widely held rule has permitted the Big Five to 
remain distinctly Canadian. By keeping the country's largest banks 
Canadian, Ottawa will be able to use those banks to serve national 
interests, especially the implementation of monetary policy, the provi-
sion of credit throughout the country and the generation of jobs. More 
importantly, Canada needs to protect its large banks for obvious 
political reasons. The blow to national pride and sense of indepen-
dence from the acquisition of one of the Big Five by non-Canadians 
would be politically unacceptable. Canada will likely leave the widely 
held rule in place until such time as international pressure for trade 
liberalization forces its hand. In that scenario, at least Canada will be 
able to save face by extracting some offsetting benefits by abandoning 
the rule, rather than throwing away a possible bargaining chip by 
unilaterally dropping the restriction. 
There will be pressure on Canada to abandon the widely held rule. 
The current proposal before Parliament is a half measure that is better 
than nothing, but short of where the law should be. The power of the 
Finance Minister to approve transfers of control only to "fit and 
proper" persons should be enough power to keep Canadian banks in 
good hands. Canada may eventually discard the rule, and one hopes 
that this will occur before the banking industry falls too much farther 
behind its international rivals. 
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